Powerco
113. Chapter 14 (Powerco Limited (Powerco)) discusses in detail the competition and cost benefit analysis undertaken for Powerco, and the Commission's recommendations on whether control may and should be imposed on Powerco.
Competition
114. In relation to competition faced by Powerco, the Commission has considered the competitive constraints arising from interfuel competition, the threat of by-pass, long-term supply contracts and the regulatory regime and concludes that the constraint they provide on Powerco is limited. Accordingly, the Commission considers that the competition faced by Powerco in the markets it operates in is limited.
Net Acquirers' Benefit (NAB)
115. In determining whether control may be imposed, the Commission assesses the NAB of imposing control. The results of the Commission's base case and sensitivities for the NAB test over the period 1997 - 2008 are presented below.
Table 7: Powerco| Scenario | NAB Annuity ($000) |
| Base case | 3,719 |
| High and low WACC (75th and 25th percentile) | 2,925 to 4,542 |
| Higher growth in forecast period (3.5%) | 5,020 |
| High and low unrecoverable excess return (25% and 10%) | 3,421 to 4,318 |
| Common cost reductions (10-30%) | 3,978 to 4,497 |
| Low and high missing market elasticity | 3,625 to 3,766 |
| High and low missing market output effect | 3,625 to 3,813 |
| High and low tax clawback | 3,355 to 3,595 |
| Self insurance | 3,181 |
116. Overall, sensitivity testing on Powerco's NAB indicates that net benefit to acquirers would remain for all sensitivities tested.
117. The Commission's view is that the requirements of s 52 of the Commerce Act are met for Powerco, and that gas services supplied by Powerco may be controlled.
Should Control Be Introduced
118. The Commission considers the following additional matters in assessing whether control "should" be introduced: the net efficiency cost to the economy of reducing excess returns; the magnitude of the benefits; and the impact of a recommendation not to control
119. The net efficiency costs to the economy of reducing excess returns for Powerco were $0.732 million in annuity terms in the analysis period. The recoverable excess returns were $4.395 million, giving a transfer cost ratio of 17% (i.e., the cost of transferring each $1 of recoverable excess returns to consumers involves a net cost to the economy of $0.17).
120. Powerco earned an average return of approximately 12.7% over the analysis period. The NAB of Powerco suggests that its distribution prices could be reduced by as much as 12.2% which would result in a reduction in delivered energy prices (assuming distribution constitutes 40% of final price) to retail customers in the order of 4.9%. Alternatively, the reduction in distribution charges would save the average direct customer $51 or a 12.2% reduction in their annual line charges.
121. The Commission considers that if control were not imposed, the threat of control might be weakened, which could result in future increases in prices from current levels.
122. The Commission concludes that control should be imposed on Powerco.
Overall Recommendation for Powerco
123. The Commission's recommendations are set out below.
- The Commission advises that the requirements of s 52 of the Commerce Act for the introduction of control have been met and therefore the gas services provided by Powerco may be controlled.
- The Commission recommends that an Order in Council under s 53 of the Commerce Act to impose control on Powerco under Part V of the Commerce should be made.
Advice on Relevant Matters
124. Control under Part V is high cost relative to other regulatory options. The Commission notes that the Minister has a wider discretion than the Commission to consider other matters including alternatives to control under Part V. If the Minister were to introduce alternative mechanisms for NGCT, NGCD and Wanganui Gas (such as a regime comparable to the targeted control regime applicable to electricity lines businesses under Part 4A), there may be benefits in having all businesses, including, Powerco, under the same regime.
125. While the Commission has not carried out a detailed analysis of the costs and benefits of applying to the gas pipeline businesses a regime analogous to the targeted control regime applying to the electricity lines industry under Part 4A, the Commission has considerable experience of the implementation and operation of the Part 4A regime. The Commission's view is that such a regime has the potential to offer a more favourable trade-off between costs and benefits of regulatory intervention than control under Part V.
126. If the Minister were minded to consider adopting a regime comparable to the Part 4A targeted control regime applying to electricity lines businesses, consultation with interested parties as to its relative merits may be necessary or desirable.
127. In addition, the Commission notes the poor quality of business specific data available through the Gas (Information Disclosure) Regulations 1992. The Commission considers there would be substantial benefits from requiring the businesses to disclose consistent and robust information and therefore, requests the Minister to consider strengthening the gas pipeline information disclosure regime.
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