Appendix H: The Views of the Interested Parties
The views set out here do not purport to outline more than the barest summary of the positions of these parties.
The Commerce Commission
Officials consulted the Chairperson and General Manager of the Commerce Commission. They agree that there are problems with the current processes applying to interconnection negotiations in some natural monopoly markets. The alternative dispute mechanism set out in Appendix A is broadly in line with a regime suggested by the Commission. They state that the appropriate triggering device for arbitration should be the Minister's recommendation following a report from the Commerce Commission. However they agree that if the arbitration process is applied to the current telecommunications dispute, there should be no need for a report.
Telecom
Telecom considers that the Privy Council's decision is in accordance with the objectives of s.36 and that it entitles Telecom to apply BW pricing principles to interconnection. However, Telecom has been prepared to negotiate lower prices than BW would allow. Telecom has been prepared to consider use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms including voluntary arbitration, but has reservations about applying mandatory arbitration to interconnection disputes. It also considers that standard time limits may not be appropriate because negotiations can be straightforward or complex.
Clear
Clear considers that s.36 of the Commerce Act has been severely weakened by the Privy Council decision. It favours an amendment to s.36 in order to restore it to the pre-Privy Council decision state and to strengthen it by prohibiting monopoly pricing per se. It also considers that the Government should adopt broad principles for interconnection pricing which should be then subject to resolution by compulsory arbitration at the request of either party.
BellSouth
BellSouth considers that there are problems with the current regime and that there is a need to provide for a dispute resolution mechanism that would produce timely and cost-effective outcomes for the range of interconnection issues including such things as quality and standards. The mechanism could be invoked by competitors seeking access to a network. It would, where eligible, provide provisional compulsory access in line with a mandated timetable pending final resolution of the issues. The process would be guided by straightforward principles for service definition and pricing.
Major Uses of Monopoly Services
MUMS represents organisations that are engaged in negotiation, dispute or litigation with monopoly service suppliers in gas distribution, electricity supply and distribution, telecommunications, postal services, airports, ports, broadcasting and film/video/sound production.
MUMS has prepared a detailed compulsory arbitration proposal. The regime would be able to be accessed by anyone seeking access to any monopoly facility. The monopoly service provider would be required to provide access unless there was a legitimate technical or commercial reason for not doing so. Such supply would have to be offered on an unbundled basis, without discrimination and on terms consistent with best international practice in the industry in which the monopoly service provider operates.
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