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For the convenience of consultees, we have summarised here, in one place, the questions for consultees which are found throughout the remaining text:

The Regulatory Framework For Determining Access Terms and Conditions (Paragraphs 185-206)

(1) Which of the following options for defining and enforcing the regulatory environment for vertically-integrated natural monopolies would best promote economic efficiency in a manner that is timely, certain and predictable?

1. No principles (apart from the Commerce Act) with resolution and enforcement by the courts (i.e., the status quo);
2. No principles (apart from the Commerce Act) with resolution and enforcement by a new compulsory arbitration mechanism;
3. Broad legislative principles with the courts;
4. Broad legislative principles with compulsory arbitration;
5. Broad legislative principles with a statutory regulatory agency (such as the Commerce Commission);
6. Detailed industry-specific principles with the courts; and
7. Detailed industry-specific principles with compulsory arbitration.

(2) If broad legislative principles were adopted, would the following principles promote the objectives set out in the question above?

1. "The extent to which competition is lessened or likely to be limited in the relevant market; The necessity or desirability of safeguarding the interests of consumers; and
2. The promotion of efficiency in the production and supply or acquisition of the controlled service."[17]

(3) What are the advantages and drawbacks of communicating detailed statements of policy to the regulatory institution via Government statements (as occurs in s.26 of the Commerce Act)?

(4) Should the wording guiding the regulatory institution as to how much weight to put on the s.26-type statements be stronger than the 'have regard to' requirement of s.26, e.g., 'be required to comply with'?

(5) What are the advantages and drawbacks of an arbitration process of the type set out in Appendix A? What are the advantages and drawbacks of Final Offer Arbitration?

Access Pricing Options (Paragraphs 207-214)

(6) Having regard to the list of factors in paragraph 214, which of the pricing rules listed below best achieves the objectives of efficiency for interconnection in order to provide (a) local telephone service; (b) long-distance telephone service; and (c) other telecommunications services, such as cellular?

1. pricing at long-run average incremental cost;
2. the BW or Efficient Component Pricing Rule; (or BW less monopoly profits); and
3. (in the case of two-way networks) the rule of 'reciprocity' and related rules such as 'bill and keep'.

(7) Having regard to the list of factors in paragraph 214, which of the pricing rules listed above (or elsewhere) best achieves the objectives of efficiency for access to networks in other industries (such as electricity and gas)?

(8) What other principles (e.g., principles relating to the technical specifications of interconnection, or unbundling of components) are necessary to achieve the objective of efficiency in the telecommunications sector? in other sectors?

Dealing With Social Obligations (Paragraphs 215-229)

(9) Which of the following two options is more likely to achieve the objectives of (i) ensuring that the costs of the social obligation are contributed to by all users of a natural monopoly facility in a way that does not distort competition between them; and (ii) allocating the costs of the obligation on a basis which minimises the economic distortions created?

1. interconnection pricing rules which do not require separate estimation and verification of the social obligation costs (such as the BW rule); or
2. separate estimation and verification combined with some means of allocating the cost between competitors (whether in relation to the interconnection pricing or not).

(10) Is there an economically efficient methodology for estimating social obligation costs? What are the advantages and drawbacks of the two methodologies ('fully distributed costs' and 'avoidable incremental costs') mentioned in the text?

(11) Is there an economically efficient methodology for allocating social obligation costs among the competing networks? What methodology should be used for allocating the Kiwi Share costs among competitors?

(12) How should the costs of the auditor be shared amongst the competitors?

The Gatekeeper (Paragraphs 230-253)

(13) Is it possible to satisfactorily delegate from the Government the authority to invoke an access pricing regime? Do the risks outweigh the benefits?

(14) Which of the options set out below best meets the objective of promoting economic efficiency subject to timeliness, certainty and predictability, taking into account any possible regulatory costs? In particular, is the judgment about when to invoke an access pricing regime best made by the Crown?

1. the courts, subject to the Commerce Act;
2. a statutory regulatory body, subject to broad legislative principles;
3. a statutory regulatory body, subject to detailed legislative principles;
4. the Government acting under statutory powers and subject to broad legislative principles; and
5. the Government acting under statutory powers and subject to detailed legislative principles.

(15) Is it possible to define a threshold, for determining which disputes should have access to a new access regulation regime, that meets the objectives set out in paragraphs 235-237? Do the principles set out in paragraphs 243-244 meet these objectives? If not, what principles might define such a threshold?

(16) Is it necessary to distinguish formally between bona fide downstream competitors and other end-users or customers in the telecommunications industry for the purposes of determining access to a new access regulation regime? Does the suggestion in paragraph 246 satisfactorily make this distinction?