Ministry of Economic Development Home| Contact MED|


 
 
 

Links to this page were:

Section Subnavigation Links:

Issue R: Timeframes over Which Costs and Benefits are Assessed


Review of the Clearance and Authorisation Provisions under the Commerce Act 1986: Discussion Document

Ministry of Economic Development
[ Last Updated 22 May 2007 ]


Within this section…

The issue

203.The Commission usually assesses the benefits and detriments of an authorisation application looking forward no more than two to five years. This reflects the fact that there is a trade off between the length of time over which detriments and benefits are assessed and the likely reliability or accuracy of the costs and benefits. It is clear that some experts consider that rigorously incorporating dynamic efficiencies in a trade off analysis is beyond the capabilities of known techniques.64 The risk is that the Commission would simply be guessing if its timeframes were to be longer.

204. Nevertheless, there is a question about whether the Commission's timeframes are sufficiently long to take dynamic efficiency into account. The broad consensus reached in recent literature surveys does not support the Schumpeterian hypothesis that big monopolistic corporations are particularly more active in innovation.65 Some of that research indicates that innovation levels are lower in markets that have very little competition or very intense competition. Oligopolistic firms have the strongest incentives to innovate because they have the best opportunities to earn post-innovation rents by "escaping the competition".66

205. If these types of views are accurate then it would seem to be reasonable to presume that the innovation objective will usually be achieved even if the Commission's focus continues to be on the short and medium term costs and benefits, provided there is the flexibility for the Commission to consider any reliable evidence of longer term dynamic effects.

Question

Q29. Are the timeframes over which costs and benefits are assessed appropriate?


64 Gerard Damien, Merger Control Policy: How to Give Meaningful Consideration to Efficiency Claims? 40 Common Market Law Review 1367 (2003).

65 Sanghoon Ahn, Competition, Innovation and Productivity Growth: A Review of Theory and Evidence, OECD, Economics Department Working Papers N0 317, 2002, pp 14-15; G. Symeonidis, Innovation, Firm Size, and Market Structure: Schumpeterian Hypotheses and Some New Themes, OECD Economic Studies, No. 27, 1996/II, pp35-70; F.M. Scherer, Schumpeter and Plausible Capitalism, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol 30, 1992, pp 1416-33; and Philippe Aghion & Rachel Griffith, Competition and Growth: Reconciling Theory and Evidence, 2005, Section 1.2, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

66ib id, Aghion & Griffith, p 85.



Back to Top