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• Information Kit
• Planning Guide
• 2. Context

• Infrastructure Development

• Infrastructure Resilience

• Business Continuity

• Influenza Pandemic Planning

• 2.1 How Is the New Zealand Government Preparing for an Influenza Pandemic?
  • 2.1.1 What Are the Strategic Aims of New Zealand's Pandemic Plan?
  • 2.1.2 What Are the Medical Officer of Health's Powers in a Pandemic Emergency?
• 2.2 What Government Agencies Are Involved?
• 2.3 Why Focus on Infrastructure Providers?
  • 2.3.1 Pandemic Characteristics and Impact
  • 2.3.2 Human Resource Obligations

2.1 How Is the New Zealand Government Preparing for an Influenza Pandemic?

New Zealand has been planning for an influenza pandemic for some time. MoH is working with the health sector and a wide range of other government agencies to ensure New Zealand is as prepared as possible for a potential pandemic.

As shown in the following diagram, MoH has set up a government-wide Intersectoral Pandemic Group (IPG). A number of workstreams have been formed under the IPG to plan for and minimise the impact of associated risks.

MED is leading the workstream on infrastructure. The Infrastructure Workstream aims to ensure that infrastructure providers are prepared for possible disruption to services due to staff shortages, or for possible unexpected increases in demand for infrastructure services.

→ Intersectoral Pandemic Group [34 KB GIF]

MoH's National Health Emergency Plan (NHEP): Infectious Diseases describes the way MoH and New Zealand's health services will function following declaration of a national health-related emergency.⁸ District Health Boards, along with Police, Fire and "lifeline utilities" are part of regionally-focused Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups. CDEM Group plans may be accessed through Regional Council/Unitary Authority websites.

The pandemic influenza section of NHEP is currently being updated, and will be available on the MoH website (National Health Emergency Plan (NHEP) [link to MoH website]). This section will be based around "alert codes" which define the planning escalation steps for action in the event of a pandemic. Changes in alert codes will be widely publicised. Apart from alerting government agencies to action, the alert codes may provide infrastructure providers and other workplaces with triggers to activate their own pandemic plans.

MoH advises that the potential impacts of an influenza pandemic in New Zealand include:

• Morbidity and mortality are unknown, but may be very high;
• Full community mobilisation needed - all government and many community agencies are likely to be involved in whole-of-society response;
• Health services may be unable to provide direct care (the orientation of health care may be to co-ordinate and support community mobilisation); and
• Very high staff absence rates may be likely, for some periods during the pandemic.

2.1.1 What Are the Strategic Aims of New Zealand's Pandemic Plan?

Once the epidemiology of the pandemic strain virus is known, MoH will customise policies and programmes in its strategy to address the particular virus. As at October 2005, the MoH's five-stage strategy is described as:

Moves from Code White (which is the stage in October 2005) to Yellow, and Yellow to Red (i.e. the escalation steps), and subsequently from Red to Green, will originate with MoH. MoH will put the notification on their website and notify their media contacts. MED will endeavour to keep infrastructure providers informed of these changes.

2.1.2 What Are the Medical Officer of Health's Powers in a Pandemic Emergency?

Activation of the NHEP begins when MoH learns of a potential national health-related emergency, such as an influenza pandemic.

Once special powers available in the Health Act 1956 are unlocked by the Minister of Health, local Medical Officers of Health have wide ranging powers designed to prevent the outbreak or spread of any infectious disease. These powers include the ability to:

• Require people to submit themselves for medical examination;
• Require people, places, buildings, ships, animals, and things to be isolated, quarantined, or disinfected;
• Forbid persons, ships, animals, or things to be brought to any (air or sea) port or place in the health district from any port or place which is or is supposed to be infected;
• Forbid persons to leave a place or area until they have been medically examined and found to be free from infectious disease;
• Require theatres and other places of public amusement (such as racecourses and recreation grounds), bars, billiard rooms, churches, reading rooms, and public halls, and all other premises where people are accustomed to assemble for any purpose within the district, to be closed for admission to the public;
• Prohibit the attendance of children under the age of 16 years in schools, Sunday schools, theatres, or places of public amusement within the district; and
• Have infected animals destroyed.

Why Prevent Public Gatherings and Close Schools?

During the 1957-1958 pandemic, a WHO expert panel found that spread of the pandemic influenza within some countries followed public gatherings, such as conferences and festivals. This panel also observed that in many countries, the pandemic broke out first in camps, army units and schools.

Closure of schools may be particularly effective in an influenza pandemic because of the role children play in spreading influenza. Also, during the first wave of the Asian influenza pandemic of 1957-1958, the highest attack rates were in school-aged children. A recently published study found that during an influenza outbreak, school closures were associated with significant decreases in the incidence of viral respiratory diseases and health care utilisation among children aged 6-12 years.

2.2 What Government Agencies Are Involved?

The Ministry of Economic Development (MED) is taking a lead in fostering pandemic planning in New Zealand's infrastructure sectors. MED is being assisted by a number of other agencies, including the Ministry of Transport (on transport issues), Ministry of Health (on overall pandemic planning, and on water and waste issues), Department of Labour (on workplace management), and the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (on over-arching emergency management, and community logistics).

A sequential approach to engage with infrastructure service providers has been adopted:

1. Direct dialogue is underway with key/national infrastructure providers (including certain national bodies such as the Electricity Commission and the Telecommunications Carriers' Forum), with a view to alerting these providers about the risks, and instigating ongoing communication on pandemic contingency planning;
2. Information is being provided to these and other infrastructure providers; and
3. Discussion between infrastructure service providers at the local level is also underway. "Lifelines Groups"¹⁰ are proposed as the fora for discussions at this level.

2.3 Why Focus on Infrastructure Providers?

The continuance of "lifeline utilities" or key infrastructure services (particularly in emergency situations) is vital to maintain social and economic conditions. Under the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002, lifeline utilities are required to:

• Be able to function to the fullest possible extent during and after an emergency, although it is accepted that levels of functionality may be less than normal;
• Have plans for such continued functioning. Plans should:
  • Provide a high level approach to management of emergencies;
  • Be both internally and externally focused;
  • Include industry sector coordination as well as regional coordination;
  • Describe response team structure;
  • Describe communication and reporting;
  • Include a response checklist;
  • Identify recovery priorities;
• Participate in development of response strategy plans (either national or regional level) if requested; and
• Provide technical advice, as requested.

Lifeline utilities include organisations involved in:

• Electricity generation, transmission and distribution;
• Production, supply and distribution of natural gas or manufactured gas (unless supplied or distributed in bottles of 20 kg or less);
• Production processing and wholesale distribution of petroleum products used as an energy source or an essential lubricant or additive for motors for machinery
• Transport infrastructure (road, rail, sea, air);
• Telecommunications networks;
• Community sewerage and drainage systems; and
• Community water supply and reticulation systems.

The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management has promulgated "best practice" guidelines¹¹ to CDEM planning for lifeline utilities and assets that may be affected by a broad range of natural and technological hazards, such as an earthquake, flood, or landslide.

2.3.1 Pandemic Characteristics and Impact

A pandemic will not be like a physical disaster. A pandemic has unique characteristics when compared with a more "typical" disaster. For example:

• Widespread impact:
  The impact of a pandemic would likely be widespread, even nation-wide, not localised to a single area; therefore there may be little outside assistance. Many business continuity plans (BCPs) assume some part of an organisation is unaffected and can take up the required capacity.
• Not a physical disaster:
  A pandemic is not a physical disaster. It has some unique characteristics that require implementation of activities to limit contact such as restriction of movement, quarantine, and closure of public gatherings.
• Duration:
  A pandemic would not be a short, sharp event leading immediately to commencement of a recovery phase. Many BCPs assume the event is short/sharp and that recovery can start immediately.
• Notice:
  It is quite likely that there will be some advance warning from the development of the pandemic overseas, but it is always possible that any warning period may be very short. Should pandemic influenza spread within New Zealand it will probably be some weeks before the full impact on workforce will be felt, although there may be some early impacts resulting from closures of schools and similar containment measures.
• Primary effect is on staffing levels:
  Unlike natural disasters, where any disruption to infrastructure service provision is likely to be hardware-related, disruptions to infrastructure service provision in the event of a pandemic is anticipated to be mainly human-resource oriented. MoH advises that businesses should plan for up to 50% staff absences for periods of about two weeks at the height of a severe pandemic wave, and lower levels of staff absence for a few weeks either side of the peak. Overall a pandemic wave may last about 8 weeks. Note that the pandemic may come in waves of varying severity over time.¹²

Staff absences can be expected for many reasons:

• illness/incapacity (suspected/actual/post-infectious);
• some employees may need to stay at home to care for the ill;
• people may feel safer at home (e.g. to keep out of crowded places such as public transport);
• some people may be fulfilling other voluntary roles in the community; and
• others may need to stay at home to look after school-aged children (as schools are likely to be closed).

A pandemic may have other impacts on infrastructure providers, for example:

• supplies of materials needed for ongoing activity may be disrupted, e.g. if they are imported as air freight;
• similarly, availability of services from sub-contractors may be impacted (this may affect maintenance of key equipment, and is an area that merits close planning attention); and
• demand for infrastructure services may be impacted - demand for some services may increase (internet access is a possible example); while demand for others may fall (e.g. certain types of travel activity may reduce).

Business continuity plans may need to be reviewed to ensure that they are robust to significant staff absences and other pandemic-related risks. The remainder of this guide is designed to assist with such planning.

2.3.2 Human Resource Obligations

Compliance with the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992

In addition to the requirements under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, continuity planning will be helpful in order for lifeline utilities to meet their obligations under the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992:

• Section 6: All practicable steps
  • "Every employer shall take all practicable steps to ensure the safety of employees while at work; and in particular shall take all practicable steps to:
    • provide and maintain for employees a safe working environment
    • provide and maintain for employees while they are at work facilities for their safety and health…"
• Section 28: Employees may refuse to perform work likely to cause serious harm [link to NZ Legislation website]
  • "An employee may refuse to do work if the employee believes that the work that the employee is required to perform is likely to cause serious harm to him or her…"

Independent contractors and volunteer workers have the right to withdraw their labour or services at any time, including when they feel the work environment presents an unsatisfactory level of risk.

Employers must take all practicable steps to mitigate the risk and protect employees, especially those at high risk, such as health care personnel, support staff and first responders (fire/police/ambulance/other emergency workers) from pandemic influenza. Employers need to actively plan to cover their risks and the risks to their workers and the public.

Compliance with Other Human Resource Legislation

The following employment relations legislation will continue to apply:

• Employment Relations Act 2000;
• Holidays Act 2003 (sick, bereavement and annual leave, and public holidays); and
• Wages Protection Act 1983.

These are in addition to the requirements of the Health Act 1956 and the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992.

In all cases, it will be useful to discuss any likely impacts with staff, unions and others that may be affected beforehand. Whatever agreement and clarification can be achieved before a pandemic will prove a valuable investment should the emergency occur.

The Department of Labour website provides further information regarding human resource issues in a pandemic.

⁸New Zealand's response may be different from other countries due to our unique geographical position, particularly with respect to border management issues.

⁹The transition from Code White to Red could be quite quick (i.e. the Code Yellow phase could be short).

¹⁰Lifelines Groups are voluntary organisations that act as facilitators to promote reduction (mitigation) and readiness work to be carried out by utility providers across a range of sectors. Their emphasis is on educating and motivating by developing and providing best practice information. They provide a technical forum with appropriate degrees of confidentiality enabling engineering and physical risk management issues of interdependency to be addressed.

¹¹Lifeline Utilities [link to MCDEM website]

¹²A pandemic could last many months and may contain peaks followed by periods of reduced illness. The 50% is an estimate of staff absences at peaks of a significant pandemic.