4. Policy Discussion
There has been little economic policy analysis specifically focussed on the angel capital market. However, much of the analysis of venture capital markets can be applied to angel capital market issues. Thus we adopt a general to specific approach in this section's discussion of policy issues relating to the angel capital market.
We begin with a discussion of the asymmetric information problem inherent in investment credit markets. We posit that the development of venture capital and angel capital markets are the logical market responses to this inherent problem. Theoretical considerations suggest that policy initiatives are likely to yield ambiguous national welfare improvements on these private sector responses. This is primarily because the generic source of the problem is a lack of specific knowledge about which entrepreneurs have ideas that will be commercially successful and no central authority will have superior knowledge to market participants. Below we:
- discuss the types of policies that potentially can influence angel and venture capital investment activity,
- present one analyst's assessment of the "optimal public policy for venture capital backed innovation" (Keuschnigg 2003), and
- present the economic consequences of second-best policies.
This is followed by a discussion of the types of policies adopted by other countries. We finish by addressing issues directly relevant to angel capitalists. The key message here is that innovation-based business growth will be best served by generic policies that remove regulatory and tax distortions to capital allocation decisions. With respect to policies aimed directly at the angel capital market, the government may have a limited role in encouraging sophistication of angel investors and market infrastructure. Potential policies include:
- Financial education for potential angel capitalists
- Profile raising of the angel investment market
- Supporting the development of angel investor networks
The Problem with Credit Markets
Market systems provide a highly efficient method of allocating and distributing resources. However, they are more likely to yield efficient results when participants have full information about the market and a market premium is likely to exist for those who can obtain and make good use of new information. This is the market premium that accrues to people or firms that can exploit the advantages of new innovations. They have a new product or new production method that gives them an advantage over their competitors.
Knowledge and technological advances have always been the key to economic advances. However, markets facilitate the quick spread of knowledge which quickly erodes the value of the innovation to the innovator. This creates a natural tension between creating returns and incentives for developing new technology. The pace of technological advance is thus all about timing. If competitive forces are overly efficient then they will erode the commercial advantages of innovators too quickly and thus remove incentives for innovative behaviour. But entrenching the returns from innovation may be equally discouraging to further advances.
The institutional regulatory response to this trade-off is the patent system. Patents allocate fixed term monopoly rights to the registered innovator. This system means that the innovator has precedence over the commercial returns that might accrue from a technological advance, but it also ensures that these rights are only available for a fixed term and that the details of the innovation are publicly available.
A patent does not guarantee that an invention will be a commercial success and this lack of certainty produces "information asymmetry" that can make it very difficult for innovative firms, particularly new ones, to obtain finance to develop and exploit innovations commercially. There will be many people approaching banks and other financiers to obtain funds. The banks need to be able to differentiate between borrowers who will be able to service and repay their debt and those who will not (or in the extreme, choose not to). This problem is particularly intense for start-up firms that wish to develop a new technology.
Start-up firms developing new technologies commonly do not generate steady cash flows to service debts. In fact cash flows for these firms are often negative, with large sums being "burnt" in order to develop and then commercialise the product. Thus lead times are long and the extreme uncertainty associated with developing new technologies makes it difficult to predict how much return (if any) will be generated. These factors make debt finance unsuitable, as:
- The upside returns for the lender are fixed by the rate of interest charged, and
- At very high interest rates an adverse selection problem emerges - firms that have a greater propensity to be sustainably profitable will be unwilling to take up finance that they perceive to be too expensive. This means that the firms that approach the bank are likely to be higher risk firms that have a higher potential failure rate.
The net affect is that the normal pricing mechanism available for banks (i.e. interest rates) is not very effective and banks shift into credit rationing strategies (i.e. refusing to finance high risk proposals). There are two key ways financiers can mitigate their lending risk: they can seek some form of guarantee (collateral) or they can invest time and resources into acquiring knowledge about the loan seeker. As it can be costly to acquire the necessary knowledge and not all proponents of potentially viable projects will have the required amount of collateral, there is a gap in the finance market that is not met by the banking system, particularly for technology based start-up firms.
Venture and angel capital are market responses to fill this gap and are used to finance a small minority of companies with the potential and ambition to grow rapidly. It is thought to be of disproportionate importance in stimulating innovation. Venture capital involves the supply of equity finance - so the investor shares in the benefits of high growth - alongside "hands-on" governance so as to assist in bringing about the success of investee companies.
The venture capital firms raise funds from private investors and invest the funds in small entrepreneurial firms. The contracts between the venture capitalist and the investee firms have complex terms reflecting agency problems inherent in the financing relationship.
Through their specialist knowledge, venture capitalists are able to add value through active monitoring, governance and operational advice, as well as financial backing. Entrepreneurs not only need money but also business contacts, strategic advice and other managerial support in building the firm. Experienced venture capitalists can offer "informal capital" by giving both money and managerial advice (Keuschnigg 2003, p3).
Information asymmetry problems will persist but practices have developed to mitigate theses risks. For example, finance tends to be forwarded to the entrepreneur in stages, with subsequent rounds dependent on the entrepreneur meeting interim performance targets. This means that instead of pulling funds out of the firm (default on debt) the venture capitalist simply refuses to put more funds in (Armour 2002).
Armour (2002) also notes that venture capitalists in the US typically take preferred shares, usually convertible on demand into ordinary shares, whereas the entrepreneur takes plain ordinary shares. While it is not clear that this use of preference shares mitigates the venture capitalist's risk in any meaningful way, given the typically low value of liquid assets, it may still be useful as a signalling device to reaffirm the pecking order and relative power positions. Investment agreements usually also provide for a range of control rights to be given to the venture capitalist (e.g. enhanced voting rights).
Policy Options - Theory
While the presence of information asymmetries indicates market failure and market outcomes are unlikely to be either economically efficient or socially optimal, it is not obvious that policy interventions can result in an unambiguously improved outcome. This is because an absence of information on the part of potential investors lies at the heart of information asymmetry problems and it is not obvious that the government possesses any additional ability to observe this information. These situations where the market is not ideal but policy interventions only have a lottery chance of improving the outcome are referred to as Constrained Pareto Optimal Allocations, as while not ideal, the allocation is unlikely to be improved upon by a central authority (Mas-Colell et al 1995, p437).
There are two potential market responses to information asymmetries: signalling and screening. Signalling refers to activities undertaken by individuals that reliably reveal to others that one is of the desired type. While the activity contributes to making the unobservable attribute more observable, the activity itself serves no other purpose and so represents a waste of effort. Collateral is often used as a signalling mechanism.
Screening is more applicable to finance markets and occurs when the uninformed party (the financier) takes steps to distinguish or screen the entrepreneur. Screening activities do not guarantee equilibrium. An example of failed or imperfect screening activities is credit rationing. A high rate of interest might compensate banks for the risk of default by a certain proportion of lenders, but it also dissuades another proportion of less risky lenders from applying for funds. Banks usually find it more profitable to offer loans at lower rates of interest (and thus generating an excess demand for loans) and then applying a set of rules to exclude what they deem will be the borrowers that have the highest risk of default.
A number of the borrowers refused credit by banks will have projects that, if funded, will be profitable. However, it will take more effort than banks will be willing to invest to distinguish the profitable minority from within this "high risk" group. It is this gap in the formal finance market that creates a market opportunity for venture and angel capitalists. Effectively venture and angel capitalists are also screening prospective entrepreneurs, but they offer the type of hands-on involvement that gives them the required level of risk management.
Angel or venture capital-backed firms introduce more radical innovations and pursue more aggressive market strategies compared to other start-ups. Once a venture capitalist joins the firm and provides finance, the probability of introducing the new product jumps by a factor of three. Rapid market introduction is strategically important because the first firm enjoys a first mover advantage (Keuschnigg 2003, p4). Obtaining a venture capital partnership may also represent a signalling device for entrepreneurs and so increase their access to finance from the formal financial market. This view is supported by the evidence of Haynes and Ou (2003) that indicates that internal equity and commercial bank loans appeared to be complementary financial resources. That is, partnership with an angel or venture capitalist provides a positive signal to other financiers.
An Optimal Policy Mix?
If one accepts that a government cannot introduce policies that will solve the information asymmetry problem then what options does the government have? Keuschnigg (2003) uses a sophisticated theoretical model to derive an optimal policy that he argues is able to decentralise a first best allocation in the venture capital industry. The policy mix is reasonably complicated involving a number of inter-related and inter-dependent strands. Keuschnigg's optimal policy mix involves:
- output subsidies to successfully established firms;
- revenue subsidies to entrepreneurs and venture capitalists;
- a tax on start-up investment spending;
- specific taxes or subsidies on seed investments by entrepreneurs and acquisition activity of venture capitalists; and
- government spending on basic research.
A full discussion and assessment of Keuschnigg's thesis is presented in Appendix III. Here we wish to note two key generalisations from Keuschnigg's analysis:
- It is very unlikely that any government would have the ability to effectively implement a Keuschnigg-type optimal policy mix in practice.
- Keuschnigg aptly demonstrates that adopting a piecemeal approach (i.e. cherry-picking from the optimal mix) is even worse than doing nothing.
Policy Options - In Practice22
The policies adopted to address financing gaps faced by start-up businesses differ from country to country depending on:
- Institutional and cultural differences in capital markets
- Different perceptions about the source and significance of perceived financing gaps23
- Different perceptions about the role of the state in capital markets.
Consequently, while a survey of international policies may provide ideas about the menu of policy options, it tells us little about the applicability of these policies to the New Zealand context. In general terms governments can encourage entrepreneurship by reducing obstacles to business creation and growth, protecting property rights and establishing adequate insolvency procedures and bankruptcy laws.
While the presence of entrepreneurial activity is a necessary pre-condition to economic growth and development, it is not of itself sufficient to ensure growth transpires. Baumol (1990) argues that while the total supply of entrepreneurs varies among societies, the productive contribution of the society's entrepreneurial activities varies much more because of their allocation between productive activities such as innovation and largely unproductive activities such as rent seeking or organised crime. This allocation is heavily influenced by the relative payoffs society offers to such activities. Baumol thus argues that policy is more likely to influence the allocation of entrepreneurship more effectively than it can influence its supply.
In this respect countries with bank-centred financial systems (e.g. Germany, France, Japan) probably tend to be less encouraging of entrepreneurial activity than stock-market centred systems (e.g. USA, UK) because banks' are naturally more conservative in terms of lending and investing - which thus limits the rewards to entrepreneurship and more severely penalises failure. Differences in financial systems are interrelated with legal developments. For example, regulatory constraints in Japan and Germany against issuing corporate bonds and commercial paper may have been a significant factor in promoting bank dependence among firms.24
Government Policies to Improve Debt Financing
Direct Loan Programmes
Most direct loan programmes do not appear to be suitable for financing innovative SMEs since they do not share potential upside returns, but assume a significant portion of downside risks. For example, the Business Development Fund was established in Denmark to provide high risk loans to high technology projects in start-ups and established enterprises. The Fund was set up to share the downside risk, but receive only a fixed interest for commercially successful projects. As a result, more than 60% of total funding was lost on more than 900 funded projects (OECD 2004).
Loan Guarantee Programmes
Loan guarantee programmes transfer part of the risk of loans to innovative SMEs to the public sector. Banks administer the loans in order to contain the costs of the programmes. In most cases, the subsidy component is not the interest rate that is charged to borrowers, which is usually some conventional market rate plus a small premium, but rather the default costs which are incurred by the government net of guarantee fees received. Success hinges on the programme's ability to achieve a financially sustainable default rate while providing loans to borrowers that would otherwise have been rejected by the private financial market. Examples of loan guarantee programmes include Canada's Small Business Loans Act programme (recently replaced by the Canada Small Business Finance Programme) and the UK Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme.
A general assessment of loan guarantee schemes is not particularly encouraging. Most guarantee schemes may not be sustainable without subsidy and they appear to have low volumes of operations and high operating costs (OECD 2004, p33).
Schemes to Pool Risk
Japan, Italy and France each run schemes where agencies act as intermediaries between SMEs and financial institutions, and thus pool risks faced by private sector financial institutions. These schemes tend to be regionally based and also offer business advice to SMEs.
In some respects such schemes can be seen as alternatives to angel networks in countries that have banks dominating the financial sector. The extent to which these schemes assist innovative start-ups is not clear. Their applicability to New Zealand is also questionable given the lower importance of the banking system to funding New Zealand business activity.
Government Policies to Improve Equity Financing
Investment Regulations
One of the key factors encouraging the development of the venture capital industry in the United States is the policy shift that allowed pension funds to be invested in the venture capital market. Other countries such as Denmark, Ireland, Japan and the United Kingdom have made similar changes to the rules applying to pension funds (OECD 2004, p25).
Relaxed investment regulations do not by themselves necessarily lead to an increase in venture capital investments. For example, successive regulatory reforms in Denmark have not encouraged financial institutions to significantly expand their venture capital investments. Remaining complications in the rules, a persistently risk-averse investment culture and inexperienced fund managers are deemed to have limited the impact of regulatory changes (OECD 2004, p26). Given that the New Zealand financial market is lightly regulated by international standards, it is not obvious that investment regulations are likely to be the source of any binding constraint on the size of venture or angel capital markets.
Government Equity Programmes
Although the US venture capital market is considered to have developed largely without government assistance, the US government did establish the Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) programme in 1958 to stimulate the development of the venture capital industry. SBICs are privately owned and managed firms that have access to loan financing by issuing debentures, which are guaranteed by the US Small Business Administration. The guarantees are provided to the investors as opposed to the SBICs, which remain fully liable for all outstanding capital in the event of default. The SBIC funds are used to supply equity capital and long term loans to qualified US-based small businesses.
There are similar schemes in Canada (Business Development Bank of Canada), Mexico (Sociedades de Inversion de Capitales), Japan (Small and Medium Business Investment Consultation Co Ltd), and there are currently proposals for the UK.
The projected net loss on the active portfolio of the USSBIC programme is about 1.5%pa (OECD 2004, p26). This loss must raise questions about the net benefit of this scheme. That is, the low returns suggest that these investments are not the best use of these funds. Related to this, there must be questions about the extent to which SBIC type activities are crowding out private sector activity.
Direct Funding
Direct funding and credit guarantees have been adopted in Korea and Germany with generally poor results. Direct funding programmes typically lack the appropriate incentive structure to carefully monitor the performance of the portfolio company. Moreover, government programme managers lack technological and management experiences to provide appropriate advice. Entrepreneurs who value independence may prefer to have the government acting as a financial intermediary to avoid monitoring and intervention by venture capitalists (OECD 2004, 28). That is, government involvement might encourage adverse selection problems, with the entrepreneurs that would benefit most from private venture capitalist supervision being the most likely to be attracted to government direct funding opportunities.
Venture Capital Policy Conclusion
Obtaining an optimal policy for the promotion of venture capital appears to be quite complex, difficult to enforce and likely to include some unpalatable as well as some popular components (e.g. taxing as well as subsidising entrepreneurs). Keuschnigg views piecemeal policies unfavourably as in his model they never lead to unambiguous welfare improvements and sometimes to perverse effects.
We therefore endorse the view of policy implications identified in the OECD Secretariat briefing to the 2nd OECD Conference of Ministers Responsible for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (OECD 2004):
- Throwing money at innovative SMEs is unlikely to be successful;
- The traditional tools of government (taxation, subsidies, regulation, government operations) are unlikely to be appropriate;
- What is critical is the availability of entrepreneurial, technical, managerial expertise to the providers of finance.
This last point reflects comments made earlier that the presence of venture and angel capitalists is a market response to innate information asymmetry problems in finance markets. Governments and central agencies do not have superior information or appropriate policy tools to address problems of this type. By investing their time and expertise, venture and angel capitalists can potentially overcome the information asymmetry problem. But the success of such projects will depend on the quality as well as the quantity of this time and expertise.
Application to the Angel Capital Market
If it is not apparent that there are strong justifications for policy interventions into the venture capital market in general, are there any key differentiating points with the angel capital market that might present a special case for policy involvement?
Angel capitalists invest smaller amounts and are less formal than venture capitalists. They are more likely to:
- be sole operators,
- rely on informal contacts,
- have a smaller scale operation,
- have less access to capital,
- have a lower capacity to provide a wide range of managerial advice to the entrepreneur (this is a product of scale not necessarily individual capabilities),
- have a more concentrated portfolio,
- have non-economic motivations.
Just as the existence of the venture capital market in general can be described as a response to market failures in the formal financial market, the existence of angels could be regarded as evidence of imperfections in the venture capital market - either angels are responding to unmet demand for funds from the venture capital market or venture capital companies are missing opportunities to attract finance from angels.
If the angel financed ventures are successful, this suggests that:
- The angel is servicing a segment of the market or offering services (not necessarily financial) that are not being offered by the venture capital market.
- There are barriers that are either preventing entrepreneurial access to the formal venture capital market or dissuading the formal venture capital market to fund what on an ex-post basis would be sound investment opportunities.
Alternatively if the returns to the angel are not great this suggests that:
- The investment objectives of the angel are not wholly profit maximising (i.e. there might be some social objectives, community-based objectives, etc that influence the angel investors portfolio allocation decisions).
- The angel capital market is populated with investors that are making sub-optimal investment decisions.
These are empirical considerations and there are potentially aspects of all four of these characteristics in New Zealand. If the existence of angel capital activities stem primarily from the reasons in points a) and c) above it is not obvious that there are any serious angel capital specific policy considerations. If angel capitalists represent successful market segmentation (a), it is not obvious that government initiatives could enhance outcomes (arguably they may actually harm what is already quite successful). Furthermore, if angel investors are actually seeking non-economic goals, one can not necessarily measure the success of such projects using financial measures. Also it is not clear that financiers with non-economic aims will necessarily be responsive to policy interventions or alternatively, if there is a predominance of such motivated angel investors one might find that "pro-growth" policies end up being hijacked for "non-growth" ends.
Situations b) and d) might represent grounds for policy intervention. In situation b) the issue is not about the adequacy of returns to angel investors, but that entrepreneurs might not be optimising their growth potential.
Reasons why the angel investor is making poor returns (situation d) could be that angel investors:
- are poorly informed about the returns they could get elsewhere,
- are providing the entrepreneur with substandard managerial advice
- excessively value their privately held information about the risks or opportunities available from the investments,
- have ulterior motives for their investments (e.g. they may be using the investment as a takeover device, as a means of avoiding tax payments, etc).
Interestingly, policy responses to situations b) and d) would actually be about seeking ways to improve the performance of the venture capital market and be about reducing the size (but raising the performance) of the angel capital market.
But the presence of the situations b) and d) is not necessarily sufficient grounds for recommending a policy involvement. Markets are always evolving. The presence of a problem does not necessarily constitute a secular or endemic problem. Well functioning markets actually require a degree of failure and examples of mistakes to provide signalling and learning devices for market participants. Thus the counter factual for introducing a new policy is not whether a policy can improve the situation from today, but will it improve it compared to where the market might take us. Can policies speed up the pace of change or can they correct for some inherent problem?
Co-Ordination Issues
Business angels often argue that there is a lack of good investment opportunities, while simultaneously entrepreneurs complain about the difficulty of securing finance (OECD 2004). This situation has been taken as evidence of market inefficiencies in mobilising financial resources in meeting demand in the angel capital market. According to this logic a co-ordination problem exists as the invisibility of potential investors and entrepreneurs and the fragmented nature of the market place, impose high search costs for both parties.
Business angel networks (BANs) have the potential to alleviate such co-ordination problems by providing a forum for matching together private investors seeking good investment opportunities and entrepreneurs searching to raise finance. In the United States, BANs developed spontaneously with little official assistance.25 New Zealand's ICEHOUSE angel investor club is a local example of a market-based BAN initiative.
In other countries there have been degrees of public support for the establishment of BANs. For example, BANs were stimulated in the UK with pump-priming assistance26 (₤20,000 pa for three years) from the Department of Trade and Industry to five Training and Enterprise Council based projects from early 1992 (Harrison and Mason 1996). In Denmark the government has funded the creation of a national business angel network: the Danish Business Angel Network (DBAN). DBAN matches business angels with entrepreneurs through regional angel networks and an internet-based matching service (see Danish Business Angels Network). Baygan (2003) notes that Canada has also adopted a regional approach through their Canadian Community Investment Plan (CCIP) and that this showed that projects designed according to a community's size and industrial structure could outperform more national efforts.
Harrison and Mason argue that public sector support for BANs is cost effective compared to other government support schemes. They also argue (but do not provide supportive evidence) that BANs do not create a significant deadweight loss, and claim that the addition to capital formation exceeds any crowding-out effects.
While the angel capital market is likely to perform better with better co-ordination and information flows, this does not necessarily mean that government support of BANs should be a preferred policy option. That BANs developed spontaneously in the US, but have not been able to operate on a full cost recovery basis in the countries where they have been set up with use of public money, should provide a warning signal that they may indeed impose deadweight loss and/or displacement effects.
Co-ordination and intermediary roles are services that are usually well rewarded, for example the banking system, or perhaps a better example is mortgage brokers. It is not clear that there is anything special about BANs that suggests they should not be self sufficient; indeed the reason given for promoting them is that there is pent up demand from potential investors and entrepreneurs who wish to find each other. So why might BANs not be self sufficient outside the US? Potential reasons include:
- BANs in many countries have simply not been given the opportunity to survive by themselves.
- BANs require economies of scale to run efficiently and other countries may not have sufficient critical mass. While this may appear at odds with the suggestion that regional and local information is important, it could be that if such localised information is what is most critical, then the co-ordination issue may not be that big.
- The premise for potential co-ordination problems (i.e. that investors cannot find opportunities and entrepreneurs cannot secure finance) might simply reflect a genuine lack of viable investment opportunities in combination with entrepreneurs having unrealistically optimistic expectations about their ideas.
- The lack of BANs compared to mortgage brokers might reflect the preferred tax status of housing investments in New Zealand.
- BANs may just not be effective. Indeed the Bank of England report (2001) notes that there is "very little evidence on the effectiveness of business angel networks" and goes on to say that "several business angels are critical of the quality of the investment opportunities obtained through networks" (p39).
In this regard the experience of the ICEHOUSE in New Zealand is potentially instructive. Their initial attempt at setting up an investment club targeted very wealthy potential angel investors. But these people were not interested in, or did not require, the services of a network. In its second incarnation, the ICEHOUSE's investment network is targeting less wealthy potential investors.
Conclusion
Our discussion about the asymmetric information nature of problems in investment markets suggest that:
- there is unlikely to be a policy solution that solves the inherent problem of credit markets: asymmetric private information;
- throwing money at innovative SMEs is unlikely to be successful;
- the traditional tools of government (taxation, subsidies, regulation, government operations) are unlikely to be appropriate; and
- what is critical is the availability of entrepreneurial, technical and managerial expertise to the providers of finance.
Business angel networks (BANs) have been posited as a means of reducing potential co-ordination problems within the angel capital market. However, this does not necessarily mean that there is a role for public policy in the development of BANs as:
- it is not clear that there is necessarily a significant co-ordination problem within angel capital markets;
- there is little clear evidence about the true effectiveness of BANs in other countries; and
- what may be appropriate in another country will not necessarily translate into appropriate policy within New Zealand due to institutional and cultural differences.
Ensuring that the regulatory and tax system imposes the minimal amount of distortions to investment decisions is the generic starting point for policy initiatives relating to the efficient operation of capital markets.
From the environmental scan and the survey results there are no obvious problems thwarting the development of the angel capital market in New Zealand. There are frustrations and the speed of development in some cases might be regarded as being too slow. However, without a more explicit definition of problems than we have been able to achieve in this study, and a more detailed analysis of how government intervention could better solve the problems than market participants, we would restrict policy initiatives to assisting the speed with which markets learn from mistakes and participants gain a more sophisticated awareness of capital market processes.
Bearing in mind the cautions we have outlined above we see three areas of possible intervention:
- The education of existing and potential angel investors. Public sector effort to date has focussed on assisting entrepreneurs' with their business start ups (e.g. Business Information Zone ) or their search for funds (e.g. NZTE's Escalator service). This could perhaps be balanced with advice services for investors, perhaps akin to the saving investment advice provided by the Retirement Commission's Sorted Website .
- Encouraging the development of business angel networks, investment clubs, etc as part of building the infrastructure that will provide the education and build the profile of the angel capital market. For the reasons stated above we would recommend passive forms of government support rather than active, or financial, forms of support.
- Raising the profile of the angel capital market to encourage more people with capital and experience to participate in the market and inform those already in the market of different activities, recipes contacts, etc. A practical example might be the sponsorship or even organisation of a conference, or series of workshops on business angel investing. Alternatively, more publicity surrounding companies that have attracted angel investors would signal the existence of the market to entrepreneurs and investors.
The market is becoming more sophisticated over time. The above possible interventions would be aimed at accelerating the pace of development of the angel capital market and to the extent that a more sophisticated market enhances innovation and business growth, a case can be made to pursue them.
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